Sharon Street, New York University
16. Mai 2019 16:45 -18:45 Uhr 2i NIG
On Recognizing Oneself in Others:
A Meditation-Based Response to Mackie’s Argument from Queerness
Abstract: In this talk, I will sketch a meditation-based response to John Mackie’s famous “Argument from Queerness” against the existence of objective values. The response is “meditation-based” in two respects. First, it is based on insights (or what I will suggest are insights) that may be achieved by way of meditation practice. Second, one part of the discursive philosophical argument will involve describing meditation practice and then seeking to explain how the practice can gradually alter the way the world “presents” to the one who is meditating. The aim of this part of the argument is to point toward a “way of seeing” the world that (so I will argue) is available to us, but which – like the ability to see an ambiguous figure in different ways – can’t be achieved either by a simple act of will, or as the direct conclusion of a line of reasoning. The proposed response to Mackie is part of a larger effort to develop a version of metaethical constructivism that is metaphysically antirealist, but which nevertheless vindicates a strong form of ethical objectivity.
This lecture is supported by the European Research Council (ERC Advanced Grant Project „The Normative and Moral Foundations of Group Agency“ grant agreement No 740922).