Laura M. Valentini, Kings College London
09. December 2020 15–17h CEST Virtual conference room
Register by emailing alexandra.klot(Replace this parenthesis with the @ sign)univie.ac.at
Rethinking moral claim rights
Abstract: There is much debate about what moral claim rights are. Underpinning this debate is the assumption that the purpose of claim rights is to designate a distinctive standing that right-holders possess vis-à-vis duty-bearers. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. The idea of moral claim rights is instead associated, on the one hand, with a family of standings (e.g., to demand, waive, and enforce the performance of duties, and to seek compensation for their violation) and, on the other, with the justifications for conferring them on individuals. From this it follows that, for structural reasons, no extensionally adequate definition of moral claim rights can capture a distinctive standing. I conclude that either the language of claim rights should be abandoned in moral theorizing or its purpose should be reconsidered.